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Using a novel dataset from the 2006 Portuguese Labor Force Survey this paper examines 
the impact of a voluntary reduction in hours of work, before retirement, on the moment 
of exit from the labor force. If, as often suggested, flexibility in hours of work is a useful 
measure to postpone retirement, then a reduction in working hours should be associated 
with retirement at later ages. Results prove otherwise suggesting that reducing hours of 
work before retirement is associated with early exits from the labor force. A reduction in 
hours of work seems to signal the worker’s wish to retire sooner rather than to announce 
the desire of remaining in the labor market. This result may enclose the need for some 
alternative policy strategies regarding working hours. 
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1  Introduction 
Population aging is increasing the ratio of retirees to workers rising sustainability issues 
to Social Security systems. To ease financial pressures as well as to increase older workers 
labor force participation policy makers have been promoting the expansion of working 
lives finding measures that postpone labor market exit attractive. 
This has been enforced through the elimination of mandatory retirement, the adoption 
of age discrimination legislation
1 and/or increasing legal retirement age.  Nonetheless, the 
effect of these measures on older workers labor supply is not straightforward. For instance, 
Shannon and Grierson (2004) show that making compulsory retirement illegal would have 
a small impact on the size of the older workforce and, for that reason, such a policy alone 
would not solve the problems associated with an aging population and the consequent 
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reduction in the share of the population employed, while Ashenfelter and Card (2002), 
studying  the  effect  of  the  elimination  of  mandatory  retirement  at  age  70  on  faculty 
retirement patterns, conclude that such elimination decreased by approximately two thirds 
the retirement rates of 70 and 71 year olds. 
On the other hand, Adams (2004) suggests that age discrimination legislation increases 
employment among individuals that are in the legally protected age ranges and that there is 
a decline in retirement among the protected workers. Also, Neumark and Stock (1999) 
show that age discrimination laws lead to steeper age-earnings profiles in the labor market 
and  that  they  strengthen  the  relationship  between  workers  and  firms,  leading  to  the 
adoption of Lazear (1979) contracts. Furthermore, the authors find that age discrimination 
legislation increases the relative employment of older workers. 
Focusing on the labor demand implications of a change in the legal retirement age for 
women in Portugal, Martins et al. (2009) find that older women affected by the new law 
faced virtually no change in wages and working hours. 
There seems to be no unique and effective instrument to achieve a longer and higher 
participation of older individuals in the labor force. This paper brings another variable to 
the discussion on active aging policies: it studies the impact of a reduction in hours of work 
before retirement on the age of exit from the labor force. Indeed, combining a reduction in 
working hours with increased leisure time at older ages may motivate individuals to work 
longer  while  gradually  withdrawing  from  the  labor  market.  As  individuals  age,  their 
preference for work and leisure experience a change since older workers may get higher 
satisfaction from additional hours of leisure and less hours of work than younger workers. 
Also, due to health constraints or care obligations, as workers age they may want to reduce 
their hours of work. This change in the valuation of time implies a change in reservation 
wages over the life cycle, which influences the labor force participation decision.
2  
If workers could freely choose hours of work they  would prefer to gradually reduce 
their time at work as they age (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2004). Since the decision does not 
depend solely on the individual’s will, gradual retirement is not as common as workers 
would like it to be (Hutchens and Grace-Martin, 2006). Although there is evidence for the 
United States that some workers engage in ‘part-time’ retirement by working fewer hours in 
the years prior to complete withdrawal from the labor force (Ruhm, 1990; Burtless and 
Moffit, 1985; Gustman and Steinmeier, 1984), most people move directly from full-time 
                                                 
2 Stylized facts show that labor force participation rates are smaller for older workers (aged 55-64) than for prime-age 
workers (25-54 years old).  
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work to full-time retirement (Hutchens and Grace-Martin, 2006). As Gielen (2009) notes, a 
discrete drop in hours of work is only observed at the time of retirement, not before. 
Given  that  most  often  workers  face  the  choice  of  working  full-time  or  no  time 
(retirement), the constraint in hours of work may influence the labor force participation 
decision. In fact, there are broad indications suggesting that reduced hours of work would 
contribute to raise employment rates of older individuals. In the European Union, older 
workers are already over-represented in part-time employment and Member States, like 
Sweden, with higher shares of older workers in part-time employment tend to present 
higher employment rates for the 55-64 age group. However, part-time employment is not 
very common in the Portuguese labor market
3 and, nevertheless, the economy shows high 
employment rates for older individuals. 
Despite the fact that flexibility in hours of work is perceived to  be a relevant policy 
mechanism to increase older individuals’ labor force participation, few studies focused on 
its  effect  on  labor  supply.  Among  these,  Gustman  and  Steinmeier  (2004)  show  that 
working hours’ flexibility extends the working lives of older workers, but produces only a 
small net increase in labor supply. Gielen (2009) finds that, especially for full-time workers, 
over-employed older women (those reporting that they wish to work fewer hours than the 
actual hours of work) leave the labor force prematurely due to the absence of gradual 
retirement opportunities. Nonetheless, a striking finding is that flexibility in hours of work 
would  result  in  a  reduction  of  older  workers’  labor  supply  since  the  increase  in  labor 
participation of older workers due to the extension of their working careers is cancelled out 
by a decline in working hours of over-employed older individuals. 
From a labor demand point of view, the work by Hutchens and Grace-Martin (2006) 
studies how and why establishments differ in their willingness to permit an older worker to 
take phased retirement. Phased retirement is perceived to be a way of encouraging older 
workers to extend their working lives. In this sense, workers reduce their working hours 
without changing employers (Hutchens and Papps, 2005). The former authors conclude 
that  employers  are  willing  to  permit  phased  retirement  but  primarily  as  an  informal 
arrangement.  Opportunities  for  phased  retirement  are  greater  in  establishments  that 
employ part-time workers, allow job sharing and have flexible starting times (this latter 
result is also obtained by Blau and Schvydko, 2007). 
                                                 
3 In 2007, part-time employment in Portugal accounted for 10% of overall employment (European Commission, 2007).  
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If flexibility in hours of work, as a means of gradual retirement, can effectively delay 
the exit from the labor force then workers who actually take advantage of such flexibility 
are expected to leave the labor market later in their lives.  
Overall, retirement decisions are influenced by individual characteristics, demographic 
factors,  and  financial  incentives  (Mitchell  and  Fields,  1984;  Dugan,  1984;  Belloni  and 
Alessie, 2008), health conditions (Burtless and Quinn, 2000; Bartel and Sicherman, 1993; 
Hanoch and Honig, 1983; Quinn, 1977) and labor market constraints (Osberg, 1993; Bartel 
and Sicherman, 1993; Friedberg, 2003; Dorn and Sousa-Poza, 2009). This paper examines 
the influence of working hours’ reduction before retirement on the retirement decisions of 
older  individuals  and  intends  to  provide  an  answer  to  the  following  questions:  is  the 
reduction in hours of work associated with retirement at later ages? Can it be used to 
extend older workers’ labor force participation and delay the complete withdraw from the 
labor force? We find that a voluntarily reduction of working hours is associated with exit 
from the labor market at earlier ages. 
The main contribution of this research is to explore the relevance of working hours’ 
reduction  on  the  retirement  behavior  of  older  individuals.  No  such  study  exists  for 
Portugal and, hence, besides the novelty of this research for the Portuguese labor market it 
is also a new contribution to the incipient literature on the subject. Additionally, we take 
advantage of a recent and, to our knowledge, not yet used inquiry called “Transition to 
Retirement”, conducted simultaneously with the 2006 Portuguese Labor Force Survey. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of the major 
legislation changes on retirement benefits eligibility in Portugal. Section 3 describes the 
data. Section 4 presents the model and the empirical strategy. Results are shown in Section 
5 while sensitivity analysis is performed in Section 6. A summary and discussion conclude 
the paper. 
 
2  Legal setting on retirement in Portugal 
To accommodate demographic aging and its impact on the Social Security system the 
Portuguese  government has approved  several  legislation changes concerning  retirement 
over the last fifteen years. 
Since 1999, 65 years is the minimum legal age that grants access to full retirement 
pension  both  for  male  and  female  workers  in  Portugal.  By  the  end  of  1993,  the 
promulgation of a legal diploma set a gradual standardization of the legal retirement age 
(LRA) for both men and women, with effectiveness from 1994 onward. Until then, the  
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LRA was 65 years for men and 62 years for women, and this law increased the LRA for 
women by six months every year until reaching 65 years old (the LRA by 1999). Other 
major changes introduced by the law were, on one hand, a raise from 10 to 15 in the 
required number of years with payments to Social Security for a worker to become eligible 
for retirement benefits and,  on the  other hand, a change on the  pensions’  method of 
computation. 
At the beginning of 1999, and in the course of macroeconomic growth, the age of 
access to retirement was rendered more flexible, according to contributions’ profiles. In 
this sense, a new law made it possible for workers at least 55 years old and a working career 
of 30 complete calendar years to become eligible to pension benefits. Even though there 
was  a  reduction  factor  linked  to  early  retirement  pensions,  this  flexibility  imposed 
significant financial pressure on the Social Security system. As a consequence, the legal 
norms that allowed access to a pension before the worker reached the legal retirement age 
were suspended in 2005. Early retirement schemes became once again possible in 2007, 
over a new law that was published for discussion in November 2006, but with severe 
penalties  imposed  to  pensions.  The  2007  law  also  prohibits  the  accumulation  of  early 
retirement pension earnings with labor earnings if the worker remains in the same firm or 
corporation. 
Through legal changes, policy makers are trying to delay older workers’ exit from the 
labor force. In effect, as is inscribed in the 2012 Portuguese Government Budget Law 
proposal, the minimum early retirement age will increase to 57 years old. 
An important feature of the Portuguese legislation on retirement is that there is no 
possibility  of  partial  retirement,  that  is,  workers  cannot  continue  in  the  labor  market 
through part-time employment while receiving partial retirement pension. Retirement is a 
full-time job. 
For  a  comprehensive  synopsis  on  retirement  legislation  changes  in  Portugal  see 
Appendix A. 
 
3  Data 
The data used in the empirical analysis comes from a specific module of the Portuguese 
Labor Force Survey (Inquérito ao Emprego) called “Transition to Retirement”. These data 
were  collected by the  Portuguese  Statistics Office  (INE)  and they refer to the  second 
quarter  of  2006.  The  module  was  addressed  to  individuals  aged  50  to  69,  inclusive, 
employed and non-employed. Non-employed individuals must have left the last job with 50  
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or more years of age.  The aim of the module is to obtain exhaustive and comparable 
information on the transition from active life into retirement, in order to keep track of the 
progresses made in achieving the goals defined in the European Union towards promoting 
active aging and postponing the exit from the labor force. 
Table 1 shows the sample values for the Labor Force Survey (second quarter of 2006) 
and the “Transition to Retirement” module. 
 
Table 1: Sample values, Labor Force Survey (LFS) (second quarter 2006) 
  Total  Men  Women 
  Total  %  Total  % 
Individuals surveyed in the LFS  45,166  21,584  47.79  23,582  52.21 
Individuals aged 50 to 69 in the LFS  11,685  5,439  46.55  6,246  53.45 
Individuals surveyed in the module  9,485  5,044  53.18  4,441  46.82 
Source: Explanation document from the Labor Force Survey’s 2006 module “Transition to Retirement”, INE. 
 
Women represent more than half of the Labor Force Survey sample, and this is also the 
case for the subsample of individuals aged 50 to 69. However, gender representation is 
reversed in the “Transition to Retirement” module, with men accounting for 53% of the 
responses. Therefore, the module sample does not reproduce accurately the Labor Force 
Survey’s gender composition. 
From the initial sample we have excluded the military for they face a specific labor 
market (22 individuals), students (26 observations), and also unpaid household workers 
(371 observations - 99% of which are women) or other inactive older individuals (386 
observations)  due  to  a  fragile  involvement  in  the  labor  market.  Also,  we  left  out  the 
unemployed (236 observations) because their motivation towards the reduction in hours of 
work is naturally biased, since they want to increase their actual number of hours of work 
(and, therefore, may report the intention of no reduction in hours of work just because 
they are currently out of employment), and the self-employed (2871 observations) since 
they can more freely alter hours of work than employees. 
The  sample  includes  individuals  with  15  or  more  years  of  work  (80  observations 
deleted) because this is the minimum required number of years with payments to Social 
Security  for  a  worker  to  become  eligible  for  retirement  benefits.  Finally,  miners  and 
fishermen were also excluded (73 observations) since, due to the legally recognized weary 
nature of these occupations, they are subject to specific retirement legislation and may 
withdraw from the labor force before age 65. These exclusions led to the sample size 
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Table 2: Study sample 
  Sample 
Labor market status  Total  % 
Employed  3,319  62.94 
Retired (1)  1,954  37.06 
Total  5,273  100 
Source:  Computations  from  the  authors  based  on  the  “Transition  to 
Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Note: (1) These have completely withdrawn from the labor force.  
 
The questionnaire of the “Transition to Retirement” module is presented in Appendix 
B.  Besides  the  variables  collected  through  the  questionnaire,  the  database  includes 
additional information taken from the Labor Force Survey like gender, age, marital status, 
education, labor market situation (employed, unemployed, retired, home worker, student, 
other inactive) and nationality. For employed individuals it also presents information on the 
location, industry and size of the firm where they work and on the occupation, type of 
contract, date of admission into the firm, regime of work (part-time or full-time), hours of 
work and earnings. For those non-employed it shows the reason for leaving the last job, 
occupation held and the industry where he/she worked. Information on labor earnings 
before retirement is inexistent. Unfortunately, non-employed respondents were not asked 
about their labor income prior to retirement or unemployment. Also, the survey does not 
include any measure of the individual’s wealth. This is regrettable since income and wealth 
are important determinants of the retirement decision (Hanoch and Honig, 1983; Mitchell 
and Fields, 1984; Dugan, 1984; Ruhm, 1990). 
Question 2 of the “Transition to Retirement” survey is the question of interest in this 
research: “Did you reduce or do you intend to reduce your working schedule before exiting 
the  labor  force?”  The  inquiry’s  instructions  state  that  “exiting  the  labor  force”  means 
having  no  professional  occupation  with  earnings  as  motivation,  regardless  of  the  legal 
retirement age. A summary of the possible answers is illustrated in Table 3 according to the 
individuals’  labor  market  status.  Answering  “Yes,  I  have  reduced  it”  means  that  the 
individual has intentionally reduced his/her working hours to prepare the exit from the 
labor force.  
 
Table 3: Working hours’ reduction before retirement, by labor market status 
Hours’ reduction (before retirement)  Employed  Retired(1) 
(a) Yes, I have reduced it  3.25%  20.98% 
(b) No, but I intend to reduce it in the next 5 years  11.96%  -- 
(c) No, and I have no intention to do so in the next 5 years / Did not reduce  30.37%  79.02% 
(d) Will not reduce  54.41%  -- 
Observations  3,319  1,954 
Source: Computations from the authors based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Note: (1) Retired individuals that have answered “No, but intends to reduce it in the next 5 years” or “Won’t reduce” were reclassified into 
the category “Did not reduce” for they are already out of the labor force. 
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As Table 3 shows, one in five retirees has reduced hours of work before retirement. 
These individuals averaged 64 years of age in 2006 and 59 years old when they started 
collecting  a  retirement  pension,  which  is  clearly  below  the  legal  retirement  age.  Data 
additionally show that those who did and those who did not reduce hours of work present 
the  same  age  averages;  thus,  one  may  start  wondering  about  the  efficacy  of  hours’ 
reduction on postponing the exit from the labor force. Nevertheless, early retirement was 
very attractive in Portugal until 2005. Negligible penalties on pension benefits associated 
with labor market exit before age 65 made early retirement very appealing. Hence, this 
sample feature of labor force withdrawal before reaching the legal retirement age may be 
explained by Social Security incentives. 
As for employed older individuals, only a little more than 3% report a reduction in 
hours of work to prepare their exit from the labor force and their mean age is 59 years old. 
On average, these individuals are older than the ones who have not reduced their working 
hours. 
Other two questions of relevance are: Question 3b “At what age do you intend to leave 
the  labor  force?”  and  Question  7b  “At  what  age  did  you  start  collecting  a  retirement 
pension?” Question 3b is addressed to individuals who are still in the labor force, in this 
case employed older individuals, while Question 7b is directed both at people who might 
already be retired and at employed individuals. The mean intended age of retirement is 64 
years old and 59 is the mean and median age of start of pension collection. Conditional on 
being in the labor force, employed individuals report a higher “expected” age of retirement 
when  compared  to  the  average  age  of  retirement  of  retirees  (64  versus  59  years  old, 
respectively). Considering that in 2005 (see Appendix A) a legal diploma suspended all early 
retirement schemes, making the collection of pension benefits only possible at age 65 or 
over, retirement expectations of active individuals are surely influenced. 
Table  4  provides  detailed  descriptive  statistics  of  the  sample  used  in  the  empirical 
analysis  by  gender  and  labor  force  status.  The  average  working  career  of  Portuguese 
workers is considerably long. Retired individuals have worked for almost 40 years and they 
started  collecting  retirement  pension  benefits  before  age  60,  on  average.  Women  have 
shorter careers in the labor force but they retire at slightly later ages than men. Overall, 
Table  4  also  shows  that  a  reduction  of  hours  of  work  is  not  very  common  in  the 
Portuguese labor market: less than 10%
4 of the individuals report a reduction in hours of 
work as a way of gradual retirement. Women reduce hours of work to a greater extent than 
                                                 
4 Of the individuals reporting hours’ reduction 1/3 work in full-time jobs. Overall, only 8% of the individuals in the 
sample are in part-time employment.  
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men,  and  this  difference  is  more  pronounced  for  those  still  in  the  labor  force  (i.e, 
employed). 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics, by gender and labor force status 
Variable  All  Men  Women 
Labor force status  All  Retired  Employed  All  Retired  Employed  All  Retired  Employed 




































Reduction(2) (Yes)  9.82  20.98  3.25  8.45  19.96  1.51  11.46  22.23  5.29 
Activity sector                   
Agriculture  5.59  7.37  4.55  5.17  4.92  5.31  6.10  10.38  3.66 
Industrial  28.43  31.83  26.42  37.52  39.00  36.63  17.61  23.03  14.50 
Services  65.98  60.80  69.03  57.31  56.08  58.05  76.29  66.59  81.84 
Blue-collar  54.45  53.89  54.78  59.23  55.15  61.69  48.75  52.34  46.70 
Education                   
0 years  11.87  19.75  7.23  8.62  12.91  6.04  15.74  28.16  8.62 
4 years  51.55  46.88  54.29  56.37  55.25  57.05  45.81  36.60  51.08 
6 years  6.77  5.73  7.38  7.19  6.59  7.55  6.27  4.68  7.18 
9 years  11.06  11.21  10.97  11.55  12.53  10.96  10.47  9.58  10.97 
High school  6.92  6.45  7.20  6.70  6.87  6.60  7.18  5.93  7.90 
University  11.83  9.98  12.93  9.56  5.85  11.80  14.53  15.05  14.24 
Region                   
 North  24.50  22.72  24.83  25.55  24.88  25.95  22.26  20.07  23.51 
Centre  12.90  10.39  14.37  13.16  10.21  14.93  12.58  10.60  13.72 
Lisbon  22.57  25.74  20.70  21.40  26.18  18.51  23.96  25.20  23.25 
Alentejo  15.91  17.86  14.76  14.21  15.04  13.70  17.94  21.32  16.00 
Algarve  9.84  9.77  9.88  9.56  10.03  9.28  10.17  9.46  10.58 
Azores  6.96  7.47  6.66  8.48  8.82  8.28  5.15  5.82  4.77 
Madeira  7.78  6.04  8.80  7.64  4.83  9.34  7.93  7.53  8.16 
Active spouse(3)  62.58  23.45  85.94  67.73  39.62  87.86  59.48  11.74  84.91 
Observations  5,273  1,954  3,319  2,865  1,077  1,788  2,408  877  1,531 
Source: Computations from the authors based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Notes: For retired individuals, the variable Age refers to the age of start of pension benefits’ receipt.  (1)Continuous variables: standard deviations are 
presented in parenthesis. All other variables are dummies and values reported are percentages. (2)Answers (b), (c) and (d) of Question 2 were gathered into a 
single category “Did not reduce”. (3)There are 2,670 observations for the variable Active spouse.  
 
Almost two thirds of the individuals in the sample work in Services, which is also the 
activity sector where a reduction in hours of work before retirement is more prevalent, 
both for men and women. For 54% of the individuals the occupation held was classified as 
blue-collar. The definitions of blue/white collar and the industries included in each of the 
activity sectors are presented in Appendix C (Tables C1 and C2). 
The  sample  is  characterized  by  low  educational  levels:  more  than  60%  of  the 
individuals have 4 or less years of school attainment. This feature of the sample is not 
surprising given the age range of the individuals, 50 to 69 years old (which means that they 
were born between 1937 and 1964) and the fact that until 1986 mandatory schooling in 
Portugal comprised just 6 years.
5 However, almost 12% of the individuals show higher 
                                                 
5 In 1929, mandatory schooling in Portugal comprised 3 years and, in 1955, it increased by 1 year for men. Only in 1961 
mandatory schooling was standardized in 4 years for both men and women and, three years later, it was increased by 2 
years; a law passed in 1986 set it at 9 years for students with first school registration in the 1987/1988 academic year and 
subsequent years. Hence, in 1995/1996 mandatory schooling comprised 9 years.  
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education attainment, with women reporting a higher incidence of this higher educational 
level. 
A worker’s participation in the labor force may be modelled using survival analysis 
where  survival  is  interpreted  as  the  presence  in the  labor  market.  The  use  of  survival 
analysis techniques to describe the data, which is done in Figure 1, shows that, as expected, 
the cumulative hazard
6 in Figure 1 is rising with age at an increasing rate and it faces a 
considerable increase at age 65.   As shown in Table 5, after age 65 the probability of 
survival is around 0.17, indicating that at that age roughly 83% of the sampled individuals 
were out of the labor force.  
 
Figure 1: Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard estimates 
 
Source: Computations from the authors based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
 
Table 5: Kaplan-Meier survival and Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard functions 
Age  Beginning 
total 








50  5,273  70  0.9867  0.0016  0.0133  0.0016 
51  4,868  57  0.9752  0.0022  0.0250  0.0022 
52  4,471  83  0.9571  0.0029  0.0435  0.0030 
53  4,066  90  0.9359  0.0036  0.0657  0.0038 
54  3,638  101  0.9099  0.0043  0.0934  0.0047 
55  3,261  179  0.8600  0.0055  0.1483  0.0062 
56  2,803  124  0.8219  0.0062  0.1926  0.0074 
57  2,465  108  0.7859  0.0068  0.2364  0.0085 
58  2,159  117  0.7433  0.0075  0.2906  0.0099 
59  1,877  105  0.7017  0.0081  0.3465  0.0113 
60  1,623  177  0.6252  0.0090  0.4556  0.0140 
61  1,282  88  0.5823  0.0095  0.5242  0.0158 
62  1,097  119  0.5191  0.0101  0.6327  0.0186 
63  874  83  0.4698  0.0105  0.7277  0.0213 
64  694  54  0.4333  0.0108  0.8055  0.0238 
65  565  346  0.1679  0.0098  1.4179  0.0406 
66  164  32  0.1352  0.0095  1.6130  0.0533 
67  98  13  0.1172  0.0094  1.7456  0.0648 
68  53  6  0.1040  0.0098  1.8588  0.0796 
69  23  2  0.0949  0.0108  1.9458  0.1006 
Source: Computations from the authors based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
                                                 
6 The Nelson-Aalen estimator is a non-parametric estimator of the cumulative hazard function consisting of a staircase 
function. The steps are located at each observed death time and the vertical size of the steps is computed as 1/(number at 
risk), where (number at risk) is the count of subjects just before the death that are still observed to be alive.  
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Relating the Age of exit from the labor force with the Reduction variable, Figure 2 plots 
the survival function by reduction status (that is, if the individual reduced or not his/her 
hours of work) and gender. It shows that those with a reduction in hours are more likely to 
exit  the  labor  market  at  earlier  ages.  This  is  true  for  both  men  and  women,  but  the 
difference in survival times by reduction status is higher for men than for women. 
 
Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier survival function estimates, by reduction status and gender 
 
Source: Computations from the authors based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
 
The Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard functions, by reduction status, shown in Table 6, 
reveal that the hazard increases at a higher rate for those who reduce hours of work than it 
does for the individuals who do not reduce hours of work. 
 
Table 6: Nelson-Aalen cumulative 
hazard functions, by reduction status 
Age  No reduction  Reduction 
50  0.0120  0.0251 
52  0.0378  0.0928 
54  0.0824  0.1838 
56  0.1762  0.3191 
58  0.2655  0.4710 
60  0.4169  0.7135 
62  0.5730  0.9986 
64  0.7329  1.2380 
66  1.5332  2.0601 
68  1.7280  2.7030 
Source: Computations from the  authors based on 
the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
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4  Econometric setup 
4.1 Transition data models: a parametric approach 
Transition or duration analysis models the length of time spent in a given state (for 
instance, in the labor force) before transition to another state (e.g. retired). The time of 
transition to retirement is called “failure time”. A “state” is a qualitative characteristic of an 
individual at a specific point in time, “transition” is the change from one state to another, 
and a “spell” length or duration is the time spent in a given state. 
In the empirical analysis there are two possible states a person can be in: active (in the 
labor  force)  or  retired  (out  of  the  labor  force).  By  failure  time  we  mean  the  age  of 
retirement  (the  age  of  exit  from  the  labor  force).  The  hazard  rate  is  defined  as  the 
probability that retirement will occur at a particular age to an individual, given that the 
individual is at risk (i.e. in the labor force) at that age. The hazard is an unobserved variable, 
but  it  controls  both  the  occurrence  and  the  timing  of  events  (or  state  transitions). 
Therefore, it is the fundamental dependent variable in transition data models. If the hazard 
is known to depend strongly on age but only weakly on time since other starting point (the 
date of entry in the labor force), then age is the most appropriate way to define the time 
scale (Allison, 1984). 
Due to the nature of the data used, some individuals are already in the initial state (thus 
we  do  not  observe  the  date  of  entry  into  the  labor  market).  This  is  relevant  for  the 
definition of the “spell”. With age as the time scale and because the starting times are not 
observed, the spell is the duration of an individual’s life until retirement. From now on we 
will call this duration a “spell of activity” (although it does not measure the number of 
working years). 
We assume that, once an individual leaves the initial state (becomes retired), he/she 
remains in inactivity (that is, there is no reversed retirement; individuals do not come back 
to the labor force after retirement) which is not a very strong assumption considering that, 
according to the European Commission (2007), more than 99% of the people that were 
inactive in a given year remain inactive in the following year. 
Transition  or  survival  data  are  usually  censored  since  some  spells  are incompletely 
observed. A complete spell of activity can be seen for retirees but for subjects that are still 
in the labor force we do not observe the complete spell of activity. That means that data 
are right-censored or censored from above. Censoring is the main reason for modelling  
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transitions instead of the mean duration as weaker distributional assumptions are needed to 
obtain consistent estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
A Weibull parametric regression model is used to study the effect of a reduction in 
hours of work on the age until which a person remains in the labor force. The Weibull has 
a hazard function  given  by 
1 ) (
 
    t t ,
7  where    is  the  hazard  rate,    is  a  shape 
parameter indicating the monotonicity of the function and t is a time variable. The hazard 
function will be monotonically increasing if  1    and monotonically decreasing if  1   . 
The Weibull distribution assumes that  0    and  0   . In other words, it considers a 
hazard that it is not constant over time. 
Estimation of the Weibull model is made by maximum likelihood. Following Cameron 
and  Trivedi  (2005),  with  censored  data  the  observed  survival  time t  is  the  age  at  an 
incomplete spell, and the data are augmented by a censoring indicator variable. For right-
censored observations it is known that the age of retirement exceeded t so the contribution 
to the likelihood is 
        θ x θ x θ x , | , | 1 , | Pr t S t F du u f t T
t
     

  (1) 
where T denotes the age of retirement without censoring,  x are regressors that can vary 
across individuals but do not vary over a spell for a given individual and θ is a  1  q  
parameter vector.   . S  represents the survivor function. 
The conditional density for the i th observation is     
i i
i i i i t S t f
   1 , | , | θ x θ x , where 






censoring right spell incomplete if , 0
censoring no spell complete if , 1
i   
Taking  logs  and  summing,  assuming  independence  over  i,  the  maximum  likelihood 
estimator θ ˆ  maximizes the likelihood function 





i i i i i i t S t f L
1
, | ln 1 , | ln ln θ x θ x θ       (2) 
In  the  Weibull  model,  regressors  are  usually  introduced  by  letting    β x' exp   , 
ensuring that  0    while  , the shape parameter, does not vary with regressors. Then, 
             
       t t t t t f β x β x β x β x β x ' exp ln 1 ln ' ' exp exp ' exp ln , , | ln
1       
  
and 
                                                 
7 The survivor function is given by   
  t  exp   
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         
   t t t S β x β x β x ' exp ' exp exp ln , , | ln      
 
Then, the likelihood function in (2) becomes 
                   
i
i i i i i i i i t t t L
      β x β x β x ' exp 1 ' exp ln 1 ln ' ln   (3). 
The  key  policy  variable  in  the  model  is  the  reduction  of  hours  on  work  before 
retirement and its impact on the retirement hazard is of relevance for this analysis.  
 
4.2 Variables used in the estimation 
Working hours’ reduction is the explanatory variable of interest in the model. Question 
2 of the survey allows four possible answers (see Table 3). We consider answers (c) and (d) 
as being the same for those employed, meaning that they will not reduce hours of work 
before exiting the labor force. The main issue is how to treat the workers’ ‘intentions of 
reduction’ (answer (b)). For retirees this problem does not arise since they either reduced or 
did not reduce their hours of work before leaving the labor market. As for employed 
individuals the treatment is not as straightforward. 
Nevertheless, in order to explore this variable we use two different classifications for it. 
First, we consider just the actions that have occurred so far, that is, treat the intentions as 
non-actions. We therefore construct a variable called Reduction A which equals 0 if the 
person did not/will not reduce hours of work or if he/she intends to do so, and 1 if the 
individual has already reduced. If, however, intentions can predict future actions, treating 
intentions as actions might be useful to study the influence of an action (reduction in hours 
of work) on an outcome (labor force participation) when the specific action has not yet 
occurred. The study of intentions and subsequent behavior is a subject of relevance in 
Psychology. The theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980;
8 Fishbein and Ajzen, 
1975) postulates that   a  person’s  intention  to  engage  in  a  behavior  is  the  immediate 
determinant of that behavior. In other words, people are expected to behave in accordance 
with  their  intentions.  Evidence  also  provides  support  to  the  theory  by  showing  high 
correlations between intentions and actual behavior that range from 0.72 to 0.90 (Ajzen, 
2005). In the light of this theory, and as a second alternative, we treat reported intention of 
reducing hours of work as an action in order to study its effect on the elderly ‘survival’ in 
the labor force. The resulting variable is Reduction B which is equal to 0 if the person will 
                                                 
8 Cited from Ajzen (2005).  
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not reduce hours of work and 1 if the individual did reduce or intends to do so. We expect 
that using these alternative Reduction variables will enable us to see how sensitive the age of 
exit from the labor force is to the assumptions made for the variable of interest. 
Age is the analysis time variable and it refers to the actual age for the people that are 
still active (incomplete spells) but, for retired individuals (complete spells), it is the age of 
retirement. We use the age at which the individual started receiving a retirement pension as 
a proxy for the age of retirement, since the survey does not ask when he/she actually 
withdrew from the  labor force (the  retirement age) but it asks  the  age he/she started 
collecting a pension.
9 This is done in order to capture the approximate moment of failure 
(exit) for retirees. Also, in Question 3b of the survey people report the age at which they 
intend to retire and  this age intention is used as the analysis time variable for employed 
subjects when using the Reduction B as the covariate of interest. 
Another  limitation  as  a  consequence  of  the  questionnaire’s  design  is  that  it  is  not 
possible to know when the reduction started (close or far from the effective age of exit) or 
the amount of hours reduced (for example, if the worker made a transition from full-time 
to part-time employment, or if it was just a 1 hour reduction). Such information would 
contribute to the enrichment of the analysis. 
Besides  the  Reduction  variable  we  also  include  in  the  model  regressors  like  gender, 
activity sector, type of occupation, education and region of residence. Additionally, for 
married (or living with a partner) people we include the spouse/partner labor force status 
(active or retired). Table 7 shows some descriptive statistics of the variables used. 
                                                 
9 If this module is to be surveyed in the future we suggest the inclusion of a question to obtain the age of retirement.  
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Table 7: Definition of the variables and mean characteristics 
Variable  Definition  Mean or percentage 
All  Men  Women 








Retired (failure)  =1 if the person already exit the labor force  37.06  37.59  36.42 
Reduction A  =1 if the individual has effectively reduced his/her hours of work  9.82  8.45  11.46 
Reduction B(2)  =1 if the individual did reduce or intends to reduce hours of work  20.12  19.20  21.21 
Male  =1 if the person is of male gender  54.33  --  -- 
Activity sector         
Agriculture  =1 if the person works or worked in the agriculture sector  5.59  5.17  6.10 
Industrial  =2 if the person works or worked in the industrial sector  28.43  37.52  17.61 
Services  =3 if the person works or worked in the services sector (omitted 
category) 
65.98  57.31  76.29 
Blue-collar  =1 if the individual works or has worked in an occupation classified 
as blue-collar 
54.45  59.23  48.75 
Education         
0 years  =1 if the person has no complete degree of education  11.87  8.62  15.74 
4 years  =2 if the person completed 4 years of education  51.55  56.37  45.81 
6 years  =3 if the person completed 6 years of education  6.77  7.19  6.27 
9 years  =4 if the person completed 9 years of education  11.06  11.55  10.47 
High school  =5 if the person has a high-school diploma  6.92  6.70  7.18 
University  =6 if college degree  11.83  9.52  14.53 
Region         
North  =1 if the person resides in the North of Portugal (omitted category)  24.05  25.55  22.26 
Centre  =2 if the person resides in the Centre  12.90  13.16  12.58 
Lisbon  =3 if resides in Lisbon   22.57  21.40  23.96 
Alentejo  =4 if he/she resides in Alentejo  15.91  14.21  17.94 
Algarve  =5 if he/she resides in Algarve  9.84  9.56  10.17 
Azores  =6 if he/she resides in Azores  6.96  8.48  5.15 
Madeira  =7 if he/she resides in Madeira  7.78  7.64  7.93 
Active spouse(3)  =1 if the spouse is still in activity  62.58  67.73  59.48 
Source: Computations from the authors based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Note: (1) Standard deviation of the variable Age; (2) There are 2,738 observations for this variable; (3) There are 2,670 observations for the variable 
Active spouse. Number of observations: 5,273. 
 
There are 37% of failures (retirees) in the sample which means that the rest of the 
observations in the sample are censored. 
The overall sample is also characterized by low educational levels. Younger individuals 
are more educated than older ones. Indeed, only 5% of the individuals aged 65 to 69 have a 
university degree, against 8%, 13% and 15% for those in the age groups 60-64, 55-59 and 
50-54, respectively. Women are overrepresented both at the bottom (0 years) and at the top 
(university) of the education ladder, and more than ¾ work in the Services. Also, women 
reduce hours of work more often  than men. Table 8 provides additional labor market 
statistics concerning hours of work, activity sector and gender. It shows that women work 
fewer hours than men regardless of the activity sector. 
Finally, from Table 7, both the likelihood of retirement and the probability of reducing 
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Table 8: Distribution of employed population by regular hours of work, activity sector and gender (second quarter, 2006) 
Regular hours of work 
Activity sector 
Agriculture  Industrial  Services  Total 
All  Men  Women  All  Men  Women  All  Men  Women  All  Men  Women 
1-10  10.39  6.85  14.10  0.43  0.36  0.62  1.31  0.49  1.99  2.12  1.16  3.26 
11-30  39.12  35.58  42.85  2.56  1.75  4.57  8.38  4.59  11.52  10.26  6.94  14.15 
31-35  1.90  2.06  1.73  1.40  1.11  2.12  22.02  17.43  25.82  13.37  9.13  18.34 
36-40  20.39  23.52  17.11  79.18  77.12  84.34  48.67  52.10  45.82  54.58  58.95  49.82 
41 or more  25.20  29.10  21.11  15.54  18.60  7.83  18.83  24.20  14.37  18.58  22.51  14.37 
Source: INE. Labor Force Survey, 2nd quarter 2006. 
Note: Values reported are percentages. Some columns do not sum 100%, due to missing values. 
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5  Results 
Tables 9 and 10 present the results for the Weibull model in the presence of censoring. 
Estimates on the Weibull parameter    suggest that the hazard is increasing over time 
1   , at an increasing rate ( 2   ).
10 
Moreover, despite the assumptions made for the  Reduction  variable,  results  remain 
unchanged: the reduction of hours of work before leaving the labor market shortens an 
individual’s presence in the labor force. In fact, in Table 9 the coefficient on Reduction A at 
column  (1)  suggests  that  reducing  hours  of  work  increases  the  hazard  rate  by  61% 
compared to the subjects that did not reduce hours of work. Gielen (2009) finds that 
working hours flexibility have a positive effect on labor force participation of older women, 
but increasing working hours flexibility has little effect on raising older workers total labor 
supply. Nevertheless, Gielen (2009) considers that increasing the legal retirement age would 
be more effective in raising older workers’ labor force participation and concludes that 
working hours’ flexibility may not be a suitable instrument to improve older workers’ labor 
supply. Using simulations, Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) suggest that if firms allowed 
partial retirement at the same hourly wage, this would impact retirement outcomes: partial 
retirement  would  increase  from  30%  to  67%.  When  there  is  no  restriction  in  partial 
retirement, the percentage completely retired declines by 4.7 to 14.1 percentage points at 
each year of age between 58 and 65. Additionally, the number fully retired falls by 15.3 and 
13.8 percentage points, respectively, for ages 67 and 69. Nevertheless, half the increase in 
partial retirement comes from full-time work, reducing total hours of work. The authors 
conclude that, among those aged 62 to 69 who have a long term commitment to the labor 
market, the flexibility in hours of work would contribute to reduce by 10 to 15 percentage 
points the fraction completely retired. Partial retirement in that age group would increase 
by 20 percentage points. If hours’  constraints were  abolished, partial  retirement would 
increase  significantly  but  full-time  employment  and  full-time  retirement  would  reduce, 
resulting in a small net increase in full-time equivalent employment. This suggests that 
working hours’ flexibility plays a marginal role in the expansion of overall older workers’ 
labor force participation. 
The  variable  Reduction  that  we  use  is  more  limited  and  less  informative  than  the 
approaches used in literature. We use only an indicator variable and other studies use hours 
of work to assess the reduction. Additionally, these studies take advantage of longitudinal 
                                                 
10 Older people have a higher hazard of exit from the labor force.  
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data while we use cross-sectional data. Also, previous literature focuses on the labor force 
participation and not on the age of retirement. 
One may wonder if the reduction of hours of work was the result of the will of the 
worker or if it was initiated by the employer. In the eminence of a layoff firms often reduce 
hours of work before permanent shutdown and the reduction of working time could be 
capturing this effect. Nevertheless, considering just the subsample of retirees, a glance at 
the reason for retirement (Question T10 of the survey) highlights that only 1.5% of the 
retirees who report a reduction in hours of work before retirement answer “job loss” as the 
reason  for  retirement.  Therefore,  the  fear  of  a  potential  endogeneity  problem  can  be 
mitigated. 
 
Table 9: Weibull regression coefficients using Reduction A 


























--  -- 
Reduction A x Male  --  --  0.265** 
(0.112) 
--  -- 
Activity sector           






























Active spouse  --  -0.886*** 
(0.077) 
--  --  -- 










Observations  5,273  2,670  5,273  2,865  2,408 
Log likelihood  1,000.678  629.093  1,003.460  556.010  494.336 
Source: Computations from the authors based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***/**/* means significance at 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. All 
models have Education and Region dummies. 
 
Figure 3 clearly shows that the hazard of retirement increases with age at an increasing 
rate and that it is higher for individuals that reduced hours of work. The same pattern is 
obviously reflected in the survival curve in Figure 4. Those that do not reduce working 
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Figure 3: Retirement hazard, by reduction status (Reduction A) 
 
Source: Computations from the authors based on the “Transition to Retirement” module 
data, 2006. 
 
Figure 4: Survival curve, by reduction status (Reduction A) 
 
Source: Computations from the authors based on the “Transition to Retirement” module 
data, 2006. 
 
The  coefficients  for  the  Blue-collar  variable  are  negative  and  quite  similar  through 
columns (1) to (3), Table 9. The coefficient in column (1) shows that blue-collar workers 
experience a hazard rate that is only 72% of the hazard for white-collar workers. This result 
is consistent with the findings of Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2005). However, this result may be 
capturing an income effect. In the absence of income and wealth variables, since blue-collar 
occupations  are  associated  with  lower  earnings,  that  result  may  hint  on  the  fact  that 
individuals with lower wages retire at later ages. 
Looking at column (2) in Table 9, for those who are married or live with a partner, 
having  a  wife/husband  that  is  still  in  the  labor  force  reduces  the  retirement  hazard. 
Effectively, the hazard of retirement for those who have an active spouse is just 41% of the 
hazard for those who have a spouse who is already out of the labor force. Dorn and Sousa-
Poza  (2005)  and  Johnson  et  al.  (2000)  present  similar  findings.  The  former  authors 
conclude that the odds of retiring early are 44% higher for those with a non-active partner.  
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While the latter find that individuals were less likely to retire if their spouses were still 
working than if their spouses were already retired. 
The  variable  Male  shows  no  statistical  significance,  which  means  that  there  is  no 
difference in the retirement hazard between men and women. Also, those working in the 
industrial sector face a 34% higher hazard than those working in services. 
Column (3) introduces an interaction term between the Reduction variable and gender. 
Results show that those who reduce hours of work face a hazard 41% higher than those 
who do not reduce hours. Additionally, men who reduce hours of work increase the hazard 
of retirement by 30%. 
Dividing the sample by gender, separate estimates for men and women are presented in 
columns (4) and (5) of Table 9. Both for men and women, a reduction in hours of work 
before retirement is associated with a higher retirement hazard. A Chow test
11 performed 
on these models rejects the null hypothesis of the equality of coefficients between men and 
women. Also, for a 95% confidence leve l, the difference between the gender coefficients 
on the Reduction A variable is statistically significant. For the Swiss case, Dorn and Sousa-
Poza (2005) find that men are more likely to retire earlier than women. There are statistical 
differences in the explanatory power of the covariates for men and women. For men, the 
retirement hazard of those who reduced hours of work compared to those who did not 
(1.89) is 60 percentage points higher than the hazard obtained for women (1.39). The 
interaction term estimate in column (3), Table 9, highlights the above reported difference in 
the hazard for men and women, between those who reduced hours of work and those who 
did not. 
Comparing  columns  (4)  and  (5)  in  Table  9  we  find  relevant  gender  differences 
concerning  the  impact  of  the  variable  Activity  sector  on  the  hazard.  Effectively,  men 
employed in agriculture experience a retirement hazard that is only 67% of the hazard for 
men that work in services. There are no differences in the hazard between men employed 
in services and those in the industrial sector. However, for women, the effect is quite the 
opposite: women in agriculture and in the industrial sectors face, respectively, a 43% and 
85% higher hazard than women employed in services. It seems that being employed in 
services is associated with retirement at earlier ages for men while, for women, working in 
services delays retirement. Because work in agriculture and in the industrial sectors is more 
physically demanding, women may want to exit the labor force earlier. The impact of the 
variable Blue-collar  is also different between genders. Men in blue-collar occupations have a 
                                                 
11 Chi-squared statistic for 15 degrees of freedom is equal to 90.91 (p-value=0.00).  
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smaller retirement hazard compared to men in white-collar occupations (the hazard for 
blue-collars is only 65% of the retirement hazard for white-collar men). Since wages are 
particularly  low  in  blue-collar  occupations,  these  workers  probably  do  not  have  the 
financial support needed to exit the labor force at early ages. As for women, there are no 
statistical differences between the hazards experienced by female employees in white or 
blue-collar occupations. 
Treating intentions as the best predictor of future actions, Table 10 reports the same 
effect of the Reduction variable on the retirement hazard as in the previous analysis. 
 
Table 10: Weibull regression coefficients using Reduction B 




















--  -- 
Reduction B x Male  --  -0.041 
(0.096) 
--  -- 
Activity sector         
































Observations  2,738  2,738  1,484  1,254 
Log likelihood  3,128.664  3,128.754  1,690.526  1,462.922 
Source: Computations from the authors based on the “Transition to Retirement” module data, 2006. 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***/**/* means significance at 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. 
All models have Education and Region dummies. 
 
From Table 10, column (1), those who have reduced hours of work before leaving the 
labor market face a 13% higher hazard of retirement than those who did not. Again, it 
indicates that the reduction in working hours is associated with retirement at earlier ages.  
When intentions are treated as effective actions (Reduction B, Table 10) the retirement 
hazard declines by 48 percentage points compared to the hazard in column (1) of Table 9 
(Reduction A), but it is still higher for those who reduced hours of work. Therefore, working 
hours’ flexibility will have no effect in expanding older workers’ labor force participation. 
Those who reduce hours of work leave activity earlier than those who do not. As Gielen 
(2009) suggests, other instruments, like the increase in the legal retirement age, seem to be 
more effective in delaying the exit from the labor market. 
Like in Table 9 columns (3) and (4), Table 10, show separate estimates by gender. Once 
again, a Chow test
12 performed on these models rejects the null hypothesis of the equality 
                                                 
12 Chi-squared statistic for 15 degrees of freedom is equal to 53.96 (p-value=0.00).  
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of coefficients between men and women. However, in this sample, the gender difference 
for  the  Reduction  B  is  not  statistically  different  from  zero  (Chi-squared=0.09  and  p-
value=0.7634). This is in accordance with the statistical significance of the coefficient of 
the interaction term. 
As  in  Table  9,  being  employed  in  the  industrial  sector  reduces  the  likelihood  of 
remaining in activity: columns (1) and (2) in Table 10 suggest that the hazard of retirement 
is 10% higher for those working in the industrial sector compared to those employed in 
services. However, the coefficients on this variable are smaller in Table 10; in fact, the 
hazard is reduced by 18-19 percentage points
13 when considering Reduction B rather than 
Reduction A. Once again, this difference is mainly due to women. 
The  evidence  discussed  so  far  indicates  that  a  reduction  in  hours  of  work  before 
retirement seems to be associated with retirement at earlier ages
14. In fact, when asked 
(Question 4 of the survey) if working hours’ flexibility would work as an incentive to 
expand labor force participation, more than 90% of the elderly responded negatively.  
Portuguese  older workers (55-64  years) present high activity and employment rates 
(54%  and  51%,  respectively),  above  the  European  Union  (EU25)  average  and  already 
above the 50% threshold for the employment rate to be achieved in EU countries by 2010 
(European Commission, 2008). Table 4 in section 3 shows a strong link between older 
workers and the labor market: current and past working careers average above 35 years. 
Until August 2005, Portuguese workers were eligible to early retirement benefits as long 
as they comprise the following conditions: at least 55 years old and a working career of 30 
complete calendar years. Although eligible, more than half of the workers who remain in 
the labor force state the need  of obtaining a sufficient household income as the main 
reason to keep working. Conditional on being in the labor force, more than 2/3 of the 
workers who did not reduce hours of work report the above reason to remain in the labor 
force while it is the reason pointed by 50% of those that have reduced hours of work. 
Additionally, more than 30% of the employed individuals that have reduced hours of work 
say they continue to work to increase retirement benefits against 20% of the answers for 
those that have not reduced working hours. The percentage that keeps working for non 
financial reasons is higher (14%) for subjects with hours’ reduction than for those that have 
not  reduced  hours  of  work  (9%).  There  seems  to  be  different  financial  motivations 
between individuals that reduce hours of work and those who do not. 
                                                 
13 The difference results from comparing estimates for the “Industrial” category in Columns (1) and (2), Table 10, with 
columns (1) and (3) of Table 9. 
14 We have also run each regression excluding the public sector. Results are not different from the ones reported.  
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When  someone  chooses  to  reduce  hours  of  work  he/she  knows  that  their  labor 
earnings will suffer a reduction. In a country with low average wages, like Portugal, with no 
partial  retirement  mechanisms  that  decision  embodies  relevant  financial  implications. 
Therefore, either the individual has a financial safety net that allows him/her to supplement 
the drop in labor income with savings from previous periods or has other types of income 
(such as rents, interests, etc) allowing him/her to accommodate a wage reduction. If this is 
the case, the same individual will be willing to retire at early ages despite the pension 
reduction. 
Those who do not reduce hours of work may face stronger financial constraints. They 
may have to work full-time for as long as possible and, therefore, exit from the labor force 
later. 
 
6  Sensitivity analysis 
Parametric models for survival analysis may be implemented in the proportional hazard 
(PH) form or in the accelerated failure time (AFT) metric. In the PH form, the covariates 
have a multiplicative impact on the hazard function: 
      x g t h t h 0   
The  function    t h0   may assume a parametric form, such as Weibull, exponential or 
Gompertz. In the PH form, each regression coefficient indicates the proportional effect on 
the hazard of absolute changes in the respective covariate.  
An AFT model models ln t rather than t such as: 
u t   β x
' ln  
where t is the survival time to event,  x  is a vector of regressors,  β  is the vector of 
coefficients, and  u  represents the error term with a probability density function given by 
(.) f . The distributional form of the error term  u  determines the AFT model (Cameron 
and Trivedi, 2005). If the function  (.) f  has normal density, then the above model is called 
a lognormal regression model. Alternatively, if  (.) f  is of logistic density, then a log-logistic 
regression model is in order. When  (.) f  is an extreme-value density, an exponential or 
Weibull regression models are obtained. AFT models change the time scale by a factor of 
  xβ  exp : if it is greater than 1, time is accelerated and if that factor is less than 1, time is 
decelerated. This means that if an individual at the baseline faces a probability of survival 
past time t equal to    t S , the survivor function, then an individual with covariates x  would  
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experience  probability  of  survival  past  time  t  equal  to    t S   evaluated  at  the  point 
 t xβ  exp . This implies a deceleration of time with the increase of a covariate. An AFT 
regression coefficient relates proportionate changes in survival time to a unit change in a 
given covariate, ceteris paribus. 
Choosing between different distributional forms is straightforward when parametric 
models  are  nested.  Likelihood-ratio  or  Wald  tests  can  be  used  to  choose  between 
alternatives.  This  can  be  done  to  discriminate  between  Weibull  versus  exponential  or 
between lognormal versus Weibull. 
However,  when  models  are  not  nested,  likelihood-ratio  or  Wald  tests  are  not 
appropriate and an alternative statistic has to be used. The most common is the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC). Considering this, even though the model that best fits the data 
is the one with the largest log-likelihood, the preferred model is the one with smallest AIC 
value. Exponential and Weibull models are the only ones that can be implemented both in 
PH and AFT metrics. 
Results reveal that the Weibull model is the preferred specification in the PH form, 
regardless of the Reduction variable used, since it shows the highest log-likelihood and the 
smallest AIC value. Since the Weibull can be specified both in the PH and AFT forms we 
can compare it with other AFT distributional forms. Doing so, the preferred specification 
is sensitive to the Reduction variable considered. The Weibull model is once again preferred 
in a specification that includes the Reduction B variable but, when the covariate of interest is 
Reduction A the model that best fits the data is the lognormal. In the previous section, I 
chose to present the results for the Weibull model for both specifications, in the PH form. 
Nevertheless,  we  have  also  computed  estimates  using  the  lognormal  and also  the  log-
logistic but it produced no relevant differences compared to the Weibull estimates. This is 
why  we  report  the  estimates  on  the  PH  Weibull  model,  measuring  the  effect  of  each 
covariate on the hazard and not on the survival time. 
Whatever the specification adopted, a reduction in hours of work before retirement 
increases the retirement hazard (PH form) or shortens the survival time in the labor force 
(around 3% to 3.8% for the Reduction A variable and about 0.8% to 1% for the Reduction B 
variable, in the AFT form). 
As Cameron and Trivedi (2005) point out, estimation of parametric models for single-
spell  transition  data  is  straightforward  in  the  presence  of  censored  observations  but  it 
produces  inconsistent  estimates  if  the  parametric  model  is  not  correctly  specified. 
Therefore, as an empirical alternative, we have also used the semiparametric Cox model to  
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check  the  robustness  of  the  results  presented  in  the  previous  section.  They  remain 
unaltered. 
A  Piecewise-Constant  Exponential  model  was  another  semiparametric  strategy 
adopted.  This  specification  does  not  completely  characterize  the  shape  of  the  hazard 
function; it is left to be fitted from the data and not specified a priori. The model was used 




7  Summary and discussion 
Reducing hours of work before permanently leaving the labor force is believed to be a 
potentially useful measure to improve the attractiveness of work for older workers. This 
research, however, shows that the reduction leads to retirement at earlier ages. Workers 
that choose to reduce their working schedule appear to be preparing their exit from the 
labor force rather than delaying it. 
A reduction of hours of work is not very usual in the Portuguese labor market and this 
is, perhaps, the result of deficient opportunities provided by employers when it comes to 
flexibility in hours of work. If that is true, those older workers that actually reduce hours of 
work may be employed in firms that can offer phased retirement opportunities. 
On the other hand, reducing hours of work implies a decline in labor earnings. In 
Portugal there are no partial retirement mechanisms, that is, the possibility of accumulating 
part-time wage with part-time retirement. Partial retirement could smooth the transition 
from active life into retirement, motivating workers to work longer while reducing hours of 
work with no significant income loss. 
With these data we cannot tell if those that have reduced hours of work have more 
income sources. In effect, the lack of variables associated with financial incentives is a 
major drawback in the analysis. Also, the static, cross-sectional nature of the data does not 
allow us to explore some dynamic features of relevance in the study of the retirement 
behavior. These include the evolution of working hours in the latest years in the labor force 
as well as the correspondent change in wages, supplemented by information on Social 
Security incentives. 
The use of panel data with information on income and wealth variables, on Social 
Security benefits, on hours of work and also on the moment that the reduction took place 
                                                 
15 Results for the different model specifications may be obtained from the authors upon request.  
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would allow us to get more solid conclusions on the relevance of hours’ flexibility among 
active  aging  policies.  Disentangle  what  is  behind  this  positive  association  between 
reduction and the retirement hazard for the Portuguese labor market remains a topic for 
future research. 
Since  financial  incentives  are  significant  determinants  of  retirement  behavior,  as  a 
broad analysis for future research, and if we are to be granted access to anonymous Social 
Security  data,  we  intend  to  combine  these  data  with  matched  longitudinal  employer-
employee data. Doing so, it would be possible to know how much the reduction in the 
working hours was, as well as to know if there are wage losses associated and what is their 
magnitude. Also, with Social Security data we can have information on the individuals’ 
payments records and on their incentives to retirement. Knowing how much a worker 
would receive of pension in each moment of time would be an informative variable in the 
study of retirement decisions. 
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Appendices  
Appendix A:  Overview of relevant legislation changes on retirement pension’s access 
Legal diploma  Old-age pension’ s access 
conditions 
Flexibilization of the retirement age  Combining old-age 
pension income 
with work income 
Relevant changes  Date of 
effectiveness  Before LRA(b)  After LRA 
Decreto  no.  45266,  23rd  of 
September 1963 
  Age: 65 years old (no distinction is 
made for men or women); 
  Eligibility period(a): 10 years 
Only in situations of disability  There  is  no  additional 
benefit  in  old-age 
pension income 
Not allowed between the 
ages  of  65  to  70  years: 




Decreto-Lei  no.  329/93,  25th 
of September 1993 
  Age(c):  
Men: 65 years old 
Women:  62  years  old  +  6  months 
annual increase until reaching 65 years 
old (1999) 
 
  Eligibility period: 15 years. 
Never before 60 years of age. 
Situations covered: 
  Long-term unemployment; 
  According to the nature of 
the activity performed; 
 
There is no penalization in old-
age pension income 
There  is  no  additional 
benefit  in  old-age 
pension income 
Accumulation is possible, 
and  there  exists  an 
annual  actualization  of 
the pension. 
  Gradual  standardization  of  the 
LRA for men and women; 
  Increase  of  the  eligibility  period 
from 10 to 15 years; 
  Changes the pension’s method of 
computation. 
1st  of  January 
1994 
(to  applications 
presented  after 
the  date  of 
effectiveness) 
 
Decreto-Lei no. 9/99, 8th of 
January 1999 
  Age:  65  years  old  both  for  men 
and women 
 
  Eligibility period: 15 years. 
Conditions: 
  Eligibility period; 
  At least 55 years old; 
  A working career of 30 
complete calendar years.  
 
Penalizes pensions through a 
reduction factor (rate of 
reduction: 4.5% year for the 
number of years of 
anticipation) 
After the age of 65 and 
with 40 years of 
contributions: there is 
an additional benefit in 
the pension of 
10%/year, until the 
worker reaches the age 
of 70. 
Accumulation is possible, 
and  there  exists  an 
annual  actualization  of 
the pension. 
  Flexibility of the age of access to 
retirement according to 
contributions’ profiles; 
  Penalizes early retirement 
pensions; 
  Creates an additional pension’s 
benefit when retirement occurs 
after the age of 65 with a working 
career above 40 years. 
1st of April 1999 
Decreto-Lei no. 125/2005, 3rd 
of August 2005 
  Age:  65  years  old  both  for  men 
and women 
 
  Eligibility period: 15 years.  --------------------------- 
After the age of 65 and 
with 40 years of 
contributions: there is 
an additional benefit in 
the pension of 
10%/year, until the 
worker reaches the age 
of 70. 
Accumulation is possible, 
and  there  exists  an 
annual  actualization  of 
the pension. 
  Suspends  the  legal  norms  which 
allowed access to old-age pension 
before  the  worker  reached  the 
LRA. 
4th  of  August 
2005 
Decreto-Lei no. 187/2007, 10th 
of May 2007 
  Age:  65  years  old  both  for  men 
and women 
 
  Eligibility period: 15 years. 
Conditions: 
  Eligibility period; 
  At least 55 years old; 
  A working career of 30 
complete calendar years.  
 
Penalization: rate of reduction: 
0,5% month for the number of 
months of anticipation) 
The additional benefit is 
variable depending on 
the number of years 
with payment records 
It  is  forbidden  to 
accumulate  early 
retirement  pension 
income  with  work 
income in the same firm 
for a 3 year period since 
the  date  of  access  to 
early retirement pension. 
  Changes the pension’s method of 
computation; 
  Penalizes early retirement pensions; 
  Prohibits the accumulation of early 
retirement pension income with 
work income in the same firm or 
group. 






Source: Authors’ synopsis based on Portuguese legislation published at Diário da República (dre.pt). Notes: (a) Eligibility period: years of work need to become eligible for retirement benefits; (b) Legal retirement age. (c) A 1977 
government’s decree (Decreto Regulamentar no. 26/77, 4th of May) had introduced a positive discrimination in the legal retirement age for women, reducing it to 62 years.  
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2 Filter 69 age 50 if








1   Question age   of    years more or    50   with   job last    the left    has   (who   d nonemploye or    employed   l is  individua the   if
2 Filter  
 
Question 1. For how many years have you been working or how many years did you work? 
 
Question 2. Did you or do you intend to reduce your working hours before leaving the labor force? 
(a)Yes, I reduced working hours 
(b)No, but I intend to do it in the next 5 years 
(c)No, and I have no intention to reduce it in the next 5 years/ I did not reduce 
(d)No, and I do not have plans for the next 5 years or do not consider the possibility 
(e)Refuse to answer 
(d)Do not know 
 
Question 3a. Can you state the exact age at which you intend to leave the labor force? 
(a)Yes 
(b)No → Question 3c 
(c)Already left the labor force → Question 4 
 
Question 3b. At what age do you intend to leave the labor force? 
 
Question 3c. Despite the fact that you cannot tell the exact age at which you intend to leave the labor force, do you have an idea 
of when it will occur? 
(a)I do not know the exact age, but it will be before 60 
(b)I do not know the exact age, but it will be between 60 and 64 years of age 
(c)I do not know the exact age, but it will be at 65 or later 
(d)Do not know 
(e)Refuse to answer 
 




(c)Refuse to answer 
(d)Do not know 
 
Question 5. Would more opportunities to develop your knowledge or your professional skills contribute (or would it have 
contributed) to make you work longer? 
(a)Yes 
(b)No 
(c)Refuse to answer 
(d)Do not know 
 




(c)Refuse to answer 









7c   Question otherwise
7a   Question pension any receiving is individual the if
3 Filter  
 
Question7a. Was your pension a retirement pension? 
(a)Yes 
(b)No → Question 7c  
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Question 7b. At what age did you start collecting a retirement pension? → Filter 4 
 
Question 7c. Are you entitled to collect a retirement pension? 
(a)Yes, although I am not receiving it yet 
(b)No or not yet 
(c)Refuse to answer 









8   Question age   of   years   more or  50 with job last the left has who d nonemploye is individual the if
4 Filter  
Question 8. Did you receive any disability pension, illness benefit, benefits due to other early retirement schemes or income 
supplements? 
(a)Yes, disability pension or illness benefit 
(b)Yes, benefits due to other early retirement schemes 
(c)Yes, income supplements 
(d)Yes, a combination of the previous options 
(e)No 
(f)Refuse to answer 
(g)Do not know 
 
Question 9. After leaving your last job or business, what was your occupational status? 
(a)Unemployed → End 
(b)Retired (old-age or early retirement) 
(c)Illness or disability → End 
(d)Other status → End 
(e)Refuse to answer → End 
(f)Do not know → End 
 
Question 10. Why did you retire? (the reason) 
(a)Lost job → End 
(b)Mandatory retirement age → End 
(c)Illness or disability → End 
(d)Childcare or other dependents’ care → End 
(e)Problems at work → End 
(f)Favorable financial conditions → End 
(g)Left work for other reasons than those previously mentioned → End 
(h)Other reason → End 
(i)Refuse to answer→ End 










11    Question it to entitled is he/she it, receiving not althougth or
pension, retirement a receiving   employed, is individual the if
5 Filter  
 
Question 11. Why are you still working? 
(a)To raise retirement pension’s benefits 
(b)To have sufficient household income 
(c)It is not related to financial motives 
(d)Refuse to answer 
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Appendix C: Definitions of industry and worker type 
Table C1: Definition of the sectors of activity 
Activity 







Agriculture  1.  Agriculture, animal breeding, hunting and forestry  5.65  5.59 
Industrial  2.  Manufacturing industry 
3.  Production and supply of electricity, gas and water 







Services  5.  Commercial services; automobile vehicles, motorcycles and personal use 
and domestic items’ repair 
6.  Accommodation and restaurants 
7.  Transports, storage and communications 
8.  Financial activities 
9.  Real estate activities, rentals and services to firms 
10. Public administration, national defence and mandatory social security 
11. Education 
12. Health and social services 
13. Other collective, social and personal services activities 
14. Families with domestic employees and family production for personal use 

























Source: Labor Force Survey’s module “Transition to Retirement”, 2006.  
 
Table C2: Definition of blue-collar and white-collar workers 
Worker 







White-collar  1.  High-level managers 
2.  Specialists from intellectual and scientific occupations 
3.  Technicians and medium-level professionals 
4.  Administrative personnel and similar 











Blue-collar  6.  Farmers and skilled workers from agriculture 
7.  Blue-collar workers, craftsmen and similar workers 
8.  Equipment and machine operators and assembly line workers 









Source: Labor Force Survey’s module “Transition to Retirement”, 2006.  
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